Explaining cooperation is one of the greatest challenges for basic scientific research. We proposed an agent-based model to study co-evolution of memory and cooperation. In our model, reciprocal agents with limited memory size play Prisoner's Dilemma Game iteratively. The characteristic of the environment, whether it is threatening or not, is embedded in the payoff matrix. Our findings are as follows. (i) Memory plays a critical role in the protection of cooperation. (ii) In the absence of threat, subsequent generations loose their memory and are consequently invaded by defectors. (iii) In contrast, the presence of an appropriate level of threat triggers the emergence of a selfprotection mechanism for cooperation within subsequent generations. On the evolutionary level, memory size acts like an immune response of the population against aggressive defection. (iv) Even more extreme threat results again in defection. Our findings boil down to the following: The dose of the threat makes the cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
"A single human being can be considered as a social community of 10 trillion cell." [1] . If it is hard to see it in this way, just look at the lifecycle of a slime mold. As long as food is abundant, these slime molds exist as single-celled organisms. When food is in short supply and starvation occurs, they exhibit a behavioral change and unify into a single body. Taking cooperative actions against a common threat, is frequently seen in nature and in history as well. Herbert Spencer puts it as follows, "Only by imperative need for combination in war were primitive men led into cooperation" [2] . Individuals, as a response to what they perceive as threat, bound together and tend to move as a unit. Similar collective spirit can also be seen in fish swimming in schools or birds flying in flocks. The waves of agitation in schools or flocks are nothing but an escape maneuver from an attack of a predator [3] . Kin selection, direct or indirect reciprocity, group selection and limited local interactions are shown to be five powerful determinants of cooperation [4] . Yet, explaining cooperation still remains one of the greatest challenges across disciplines [5] . Here, we discuss the dose of the threat imposed by environment as another way to obtain cooperation.
In Ref [6] , Robert Wright says, "interaction among individual genes, or cells, or animals, among interest groups, or nations, or corporations, can be viewed through the lenses of game theory." Nevertheless, the amount of information came to light from huge number of interactions, can easily exceed the processing capabilities of the interacting parties. This is also referred as attention scarcity problem in the literature [7, 8] . Dunbar's number indicates a cognitive limit to the number of individuals with whom one can maintain stable relationships [9] . This limit is claimed to be a direct function of relative neocortex size of the species and this in turn * uzay00@gmail.com limits group size. To make the best of a bad situation (information overload), a selective attention mechanism is needed. Preferentially attending to threat is one of the most common evolutionary outcomes [10] . Evolutionary psychologists demonstrated that social exchange in a group requires the existence of some mechanisms for detecting cheaters, but do not require any mechanisms for detecting altruists [11] .
In our previous work, we coined the term Attention Game to define an interacting environment where players can only pay attention to a portion of the information they receive [12] . We worked on attention games in a specific context of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. We have concluded that it is crucial for attention to be focused on potentially threatening information. In this article, we will extend our work by introducing heterogeneity and inter-generational transmission. We will also investigate the outcomes of biased payoff matrix.
II. MODEL
We propose an agent-based model to study the coevolution of memory and cooperation. A population of N agents, who have limited memory size, will play Prisoner's Dilemma Game iteratively. To this end, we have represented each agent with two features related to their memory size and defection rate. We define the pair (µ, ρ) as the genotype of an agent. Here, ρ ∈ [0, 1] determines the defection rate of an agent. That is, it simply chooses to defect with probability ρ or to cooperate with probability 1 − ρ. We assume that agents can store and update information about only a limited number of their opponents. Memory size is the limit that indicates the number of opponents one can remember. We let µ ∈ [0, 1] be the memory size ratio of an agent, which is equal to the memory size divided by the population size.
Memory serves to keep track of past experiences. Each memory slot is dedicated to one particular opponent. After every round with the same opponent, the corresponding memory slot is updated. There are two numbers in the memory slot: the number of defections received from the opponent and the total number of plays with it. So the ratio of these two numbers gives the perceived defection rate of the opponent. Another assumption we made is as follows: If this ratio is greater than or equal to a threshold of θ = 0.5, the opponent is perceived as a defector. Otherwise it is perceived as a cooperator. As one keeps playing with new opponents, eventually there will be not enough room in the memory. Thus a selective attention strategy is required to decide which agents to keep in memory and which agents to forget. We know that it is best for agents to direct their attention to the threatening information of defectors [12] . Thus, we assume the following strategy: To afford space, forget one cooperator selected uniformly at random. If there is no cooperator left, then select one defector uniformly at random and forget it.
The first generation is initialized with N = 100 agents, whose genes are set uniformly at random. That is, µ and ρ values differ from agent to agent. In each round, a pair of agent is selected uniformly at random to play the game. We assume that, agents are reciprocal, in the sense that they can accept or refuse to play with their opponent. Refusal takes place only with the opponents that are previously perceived as defectors. Once they made their choice to play, each agent, based on its own defection rate ρ, takes one of two possible actions: defect or cooperate. Each agent receives different payoffs according to their joint actions, as shown in Table I .
TABLE I: Payoff Matrix. In the case of mutual cooperation, both receive the reward payoff R. If one cooperates while the other defects, cooperator gets the suckers payoff S and defector gets the temptation payoff T . In the case of mutual defection, both get the punishment payoff P . To be a Prisoner's Dilemma Game, the following conditions must hold for the payoffs: S < P < R < T and T + S < 2R [13] .
Lifetime of a generation is fixed to N 2 τ rounds. That enables every pair to play τ = 30 times on the average. Agents with fitter genetic code will gather higher payoffs during their lifespans. The accumulated payoffs forge the welfare of an agent. Normalized welfare is defined to be the fitness value of an agent. Normalization is done by first subtracting the minimum welfare then dividing each new welfare by their sum. At the end of a generation, agents reproduce proportional to their fitness value. A roulette wheel selection is applied for reproduction. To keep the population size constant, only N newborns are kept for the next population and parents are cut out. Memory content of a newborn is initially empty. Reproduction is asexual and every child gets exact copy of its parent genome, unless there is a mutation. We used a mutation rate of r = 0.05 for variation. That is 5% of the offspring population, will be different from their parents in one random gene only. Mutation assigns a uniform random number in [0, 1] to either µ or ρ. We have investigated 500 subsequent generations.
III. RESULTS
Agents can be represented by points on µ-ρ plane where x-axis is the memory ratio µ and y-axis is the defection rate ρ. The point (µ i , ρ i ) displays the i'th agent. The average defection rate and the average memory size ratio of the current population are given by
We can picture the average genotype (µ,ρ), as a point on that phase plane. Initial population starts with an average genotype close to (0.5, 0.5). Tracking the values of (µ,ρ), pairs from generation to generation will make us to see the co-evolution of cooperation and memory, as in 
A. Absence of Threat
In the first set of simulations, we used the standard payoff values of (S, P, R, T ) = (0, 1, 3, 5). By threat, we mean negative payoffs. We refer the case of non-negative payoffs as an absence of threat. An averaged trajectory over 50 different realizations of the same initial population, can be seen in Fig. 1 . Two dynamics are observed. (i) Average memory size tends to decrease independent of the average defection rate of the population. (ii) Average defection rate decreases if memory size is high and increases if it is low. That is, memory size has a negative effect on defection rate but defection rate has no influence on memory. In Fig. 1 , the average defection rate of the population decreases when the average memory size ratio is relatively high (0.35 < µ) and it increases when the average memory size ratio is relatively low (µ < 0.25).
Without memory (µ → 0), cooperation becomes vulnerable and defection succeeds (ρ → 1). The average genotype of the population gradually reaches to a point very close to (0, 1). That is, agents become memoryless and defective when there is no threat.
It is known that evolution may lead to unexpected paths. The observation of the unconditional decrease of the memory size is totally unexpected. To understand it, first suppose a population that is composed of defectors only. Is it better for defectors to have greater memory size? The answer is no, as long as punishment payoff P is greater than zero. The reason is as follows: defectors with high memory size loose punishment payoff P = 1, just because they remember and refuse other defectors. Thus they end up with lower fitness and they are selected away. The second case of cooperators only, is a bit trickier. Previously we determined how agents perceive the world. Perception is open to mistakes (as it is the case for real life). A cooperator with a low defection rate can be perceived as a defector, just because it is happened to defect more than cooperate in its first few rounds. As a result of this misperception, high memory size can cause to avoid engaging rounds with agents whose intention is mostly cooperate.
The surprising downside of having a greater memory size is isolation which leads to a deficient fitness. Thus, by means of mutations, subsequent generations get rid of their memory in the case of harmless defection. One can find this, initially, deeply counter intuitive and not realistic. But there are cases where species lost their brains as a result of evolution. According to Frank Hirth, in their ancient evolutionary past, sea sponges did have neurons [14] . Some extremely simple animals, such as sea squirts, simplify their brains during their lifetimes. Sea squirt has a nervous system in order to navigate in the sea. Its only goal is to find a suitable rock to live on for the rest of its life. When it implants on a rock, the first thing it does is to digest its nervous system. Without a problem to solve, there is no need to waste energy on a brain. In order for evolution to promote increased brain size, its benefits, e.g. against predation threat, must outweigh the high energetic costs [15] . In our case, the absence of a real threat invalidates the need for a greater memory size.
B. Presence of Threat
We investigate the outcomes of an alternative formulation of negative payoffs, as in Ref [16] . Up to this point, in our model defection was harmless. S = 0 means that refusing a defector or playing with it, is apparently indifferent for a cooperator. Moreover, from the perspective of defectors, it is better to mutually defect than to refuse other defectors, since P > 0. It is known that evolution is about the survival of the most suited organisms for the current environmental conditions. When we use a biased payoff matrix, environment differs and dynamics dramatically change. Let's define aggressive defection as an harmful act that reduces the welfare of the agents that are subjected to it. Prisoner's Dilemma game under aggressive defection can be given as S < P < 0 < R < T . This inequality does not violate the game conditions. Now, receiving a defection results in negative values and it hurts. Thus having a greater memory size may become advantageous, in contrast to the case of standard non-negative payoff matrix.
Two dynamics begin to compete at the evolutionary level. (i) Tendency to increase memory size in order to maintain self-protection when average defection rate gets higher. (ii) Tendency to decrease memory size to avoid self-isolation when average defection rate gets lower. These two dynamics can give rise to oscil-latory behaviors. In Fig. 2 , we display the dynamics of a single realization for a biased payoff matrix where (S, P, R, T ) = (−7, −6, 4, 5). Let's start with a population whose average memory size ratio is high. Agents with high memory size can protect themselves from defection. Thus defectors incur isolation and their fitness diminishes. Eventually, cooperators with high memory size fill the population. When almost all agents turn out to be cooperator, misperception becomes an issue. High memory size may block interactions among cooperators and this is the reason why evolution prefers cooperators with smaller memory size. Population without a valuable memory provides an excellent opportunity not to be missed by mutant defectors. Thus population starts to be filled by defectors and the average defection rate of the population increases. Only cooperators with high memory size can resist to defectors, let's call them sceptic cooperators. If there exists still some critical number of sceptic cooperators, resistance can take place and defectors can be outcompeted. That is, cooperators with high memory size again fill the population. This cyclic behavior repeats itself until relative abundance of the sceptic cooperators becomes inadequate to resist defectors. In that case, defectors invade population. Under aggressive defection, defectors with lower memory size, have no chance to survive. Thus, the average genotype of the population moves towards a point close to (1, 1) . Population genotype can stuck around this point or it can escape to continue its trending cyclic behavior. That depends not only the payoff matrix but also the dynamic composition of the heterogeneous population at any given time.
C. The Dose That Makes the Cooperation
Each payoff matrix has its own dynamics and it is really hard to make generalizations. To reduce the complexity, we consider a special case of S < P < −T < 0 < R < T for which we set P − S = −T − P = T − R = T . We investigate the effect of the difference ratio = (T − R)/T to the cooperation in Fig. 3 . As goes to zero, cooperation or defection becomes indifferent actions for an agent. But since receiving defection cause damage, agents tend to have a relatively higher memory size. Defection does not bring any significant extra points. Moreover defectors risk isolation. That is why defectors are selected away and cooperation succeeds in general for T < T /3. As gets larger, not only the temptation to defect turns out to be more attractive, but also the damage caused by the aggressive defection gets worse, and eventually defection pays off.
Our model shares with Epstein [16] , the effect of negative payoffs in the emergence of cooperation. But it differs in many other respects. First, our model allows agents to have varying memory size and defection rate, whereas Epstein's model allows only pure cooperators and pure defectors with zero-memory. The structure of a system, determines who interacts with whom and causes its dynamic behavior. In our model, memory has a critical role, as it is used to hinder interactions with defectors according to the reciprocity norm. In Ref [16] , it is only the spatial aspects of the environment which hinders cooperators from interacting with defectors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Necessity is the mother of invention. We see a positive function of threat in having a greater memory size. An appropriate level of threat (i.e. T < T /3) accompanied by the reciprocity norm, that is refusal of defectors, increases the cooperativeness of the population. Another important outcome of our model is as follows: Under aggressive defection, the trajectory of the evolving population may exhibit a trending cyclic behavior. At the evolutionary level, we observe immune responses in cycles, as it is shown in Fig. 2a . Memory size acts like an immune response of the population. Memory crashes when defection rate is low, but spikes up as a response to growing defection rate in the population, then crashes again and recover again depending on the average defection rate of the population. This emergent self-regulating behavior goes on unless the relative abundance of sceptic cooperators becomes irrecoverably low. Not individual agents, but populations from generations to generations evolved to develop some kind of protection mechanism against aggressive defection. This is an un-programmed functionality that emerged via evolutionary dynamics.
It is possible to make analogies with two different scientific results from immunology and experimental psychology. It is thought that the immune system functions by making distinction between self and non-self. This viewpoint is renewed with the idea that the immune sys-tem is more concerned with entities that do damage than with those that are foreign [17] . Actually, threat calls for taking countermeasures against the would-be-exploiter. Experimental evidence from psychology has shown that the cooperation typically collapses in the absence of sanctioning possibilities [18] . The threat of punishment is the key to maintain and promote cooperation [19, 20] . To conclude, in order for cooperation to emerge, selfish beings need to be exposed to an appropriate level of threat. When defection is harmless agents tend to defect and when defection cause an extreme damage, cooperators have no chance to survive. We observe that the conditions for the emergence of cooperation are very subtle.
To increase the immunity of cooperation, differentiation of cooperators or some kind of collective memory can be incorporated to our model as a future work.
